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NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE COMPARATIVE LAW 
AND POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
David Landau*
DAVID M. BRINKS & ABBY BLASS, THE DNA OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN 
LATIN AMERICA (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP. 278.
HARDCOVER $110.00. PAPERBACK $34.99.
THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICO-LEGAL DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018) PP. 386.
HARDCOVER $120.00. PAPERBACK $37.99.
The comparative constitutional politics of judicial review remain largely defined by 
LPSRUWDQWZRUNVWKDWDUHQRZPRUHWKDQDGHFDGHROG7RP*LQVEXUJ¶V³LQVXUDQFH´WKHRU\1
DQG 5DQ +LUVFKO¶V ³KHJHPRQLF SUHVHUYDWLRQ´ WKHVLV2 both clarified the ways in which 
politics shape the design and functionLQJRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRXUWV*LQVEXUJ¶VERRNVKRZHG
how the presence of political competition in Asia incentivized politicians to create and 
PDLQWDLQ³LQGHSHQGHQW´MXGLFLDULHV+LUVFKOUHFRXQWHGFDVHVIURPVHYHUDOFRXQWULHVZKHUH
embattled political elites empowered courts to insulate their policy preferences. At a higher 
level, the two books showed how the spread and strengthening of judicial review were 
inextricably bound up with national politics. 
The two books reviewed here, Daniel Brinks and Abby BlasV¶V The DNA of 
Constitutional Justice in Latin America3 DQG 7KHXQLV 5RX[¶V The Politico-Legal 
Dynamics of Judicial Review,4 help give us theoretical tools and empirical insights that 
further push on the intertwinement between law and politics on high national courts. They 
push towards fruitful new directions in research, particularly in fleshing out the causes and 
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIGLIIHUHQW³UHJLPHV´RIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ%RWKERRNVEXLOGRQFODVVLFZRUNV
in the field, while challenging core concepts. 
                                                          
*Mason Ladd Professor and Associate Dean for International Programs, Florida State University College of Law. 
 1. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN 
CASES (2003). 
 2. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (2004). 
 3. DANIEL M. BRINKS & ABBY BLASS, THE DNA OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA:
POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND JUDICIAL DESIGN (2018). 
 4. THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICO-LEGAL DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(2018). 
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 39 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 39 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
LANDAU, D - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 6:45 AM 
226 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:225 
Brinks aQG%ODVV¶VDLPLVWRLOOXPLQDWHWKHGHVLJQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRXUWVLQUHFHQW
Latin American history. They argue that high courts serve as a mechanism for 
³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO JRYHUQDQFH´ ZLWK DQ RULJLQDWLQJ ³FRDOLWLRQ´ WKDW GHVLJQV D FRXUW WR EH
responsive to its goals over time.5 They propose a useful division of judicial design into 
two parts: the scope of judicial authority, and mechanisms of judicial control and 
accountability.6 7KHILUVWGLPHQVLRQGHDOVZLWKDFRXUW¶VDELOLW\WRLQWHUYHQHLQGLIIHUHQW
kinds of policy matters; the second with the ways in which political actors (or others) can 
control a court with ex ante and ex post controls. The first dimension thus focuses on the 
thickness of constitutional rights themselves, the ability of both elites and citizens to access 
the courts in different ways, and the breadth of the effect of a judgment. The second is 
about appointment mechanisms (which kinds of actors appoint judges, and in what 
combination), the length and renewability of terms, and the ease and nature of removal. 
Brinks and Blass create a set of measures for both dimensions and show that there 
are some general regional trends over time. For example, most courts designed more 
recently have a higher scope of authority than those designed in the past.7 This reflects the 
LQIOXHQFH RI WKH ³QHZ FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´ LQ /DWLQ$PHULFDZKLFK KDV OHG WR D JUHDWHU
amount of constitutional rights and more comfort with judicial enforcement of those 
rights.8 But at the same time, they show that designs continue to show significant variance, 
with the two dimensions of judicial power grouped into four different kinds of courts. 
7KHUHDUH³VLGHOLQHGFRXUWV´ZLWKOLWWOHDXWKRULW\RUDXWRQRP\³SURFHGXUDODUELWHUV´WKDW
are fairly autonomous but can be accessed only on a narrow range of issues by elites, 
³UHJLPHDOOLHV´WKDWODFNDXWRQRP\EXWKDYHDKLJKVFRSHRIDXWKRULW\DQGILQDOO\³PDMRU
SROLF\SOD\HUV´WKDWDUHVWURQJRQERWKGLPHQVLRQV9
The authors conduct quantitative tests, as well as case studies, that support the idea 
that each of these kinds of courts tend to be designed in different political contexts. The 
causal variables sweep beyond the emphasis on political competition in the classic works 
WR DOVR LQFOXGHPRUH LGHRORJLFDO IDFWRUV)RU H[DPSOH D ³SURFHGXUDO DUELWHU´PLJKWEH
created when the political coalition creating a court is pluralistic but also seeks to restrict 
access because it seeks an institution mainly to adjudicate disputes between elites (as in 
0H[LFRLQ³0DMRUSROLF\SOD\HUV´JHW formed where a pluralistic coalition includes 
members, often on the left, who are ideologically committed to more aggressive judicial 
enforcement of rights (as in Colombia in 1991). )LQDOO\ D³UHJLPHDOO\´FRXUWPD\EH
expected when the originating coalition designing a court is dominated by a single political 
force that expects to control appointments to the tribunal for the indefinite future; that force 
might thus seek a tribunal with a high scope of authority, but low autonomy, so that the 
tribunal will carry out a range of useful tasks for the regime (as in Venezuela in and after 
1999). %ULQNVDQG%ODVV¶VFRQFHSWRIDUHJLPHDOO\GRYHWDLOVZHOOZLWKRWKHUZRUNVKRZLQJ
how modern authoritarian or competitive authoritarian regimes sometimes rely on courts 
to carry out a range of tasks, and thus may imbue those courts with a great degree of 
                                                          
 5. See BRINKS & BLASS, supra note 3, at 8±9.
 6. See id. at 20±22. 
 7. See id. at 33. 
 8. See id. at 178. 
 9. See id. at 31. 
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authority even as they use ex ante and ex post mechanisms to tether the court tightly to 
regime preferences. As Dixon and I have recently argued, a political actor seeking to take 
over a court, but to use it for core regime tasks such as repressing opposition politicians or 
consolidating political power, may attack appointment mechanisms but leave the formal 
powers of a court intact or even expand them.10
7KHXQLV5RX[¶VVtudy of the political-legal dynamics of judicial review aims at the 
question of how judges and legal elites justify and talk about judicial review. He argues 
that there are different ways in which constitutional orders relate law and politics. Drawing 
off RIFODVVLFVRFLRORJLFDOWKHRU\E\1RQHWDQG6HO]QLFNKHFRQWUDVWV³OHJDOLVWLF´UHJLPHV
RIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZWKDWFOHDUO\VHSDUDWHODZDQGSROLWLFVIURP³LQVWUXPHQWDO´UHJLPHVWKDW
see law and politics as unavoidably intertwined.11 From this, and the question of whether 
a regime is authoritarian or democratic, he draws a four-part typology of judicial review 
regimes, which he examines primarily by doing three detailed case studies of Australia 
(democratic legalism), India (democratic instrumentalism), and Zimbabwe (authoritarian 
legalism, with an interlude of instrumentalism). He then examines the landscape of judicial 
review in ten other countries, as a check on the initial conclusions. 
Roux is interested in the question of how regimes change²he argues that they are 
related to, but distinct from, both ordinary politics and formal constitutional replacement. 
Instead, they reflect a set of attitudes about constitutional law that are relatively durable, 
tend to revert to type, and are generally only changed through a significant exogenous 
VKRFN$WWHPSWHG VKLIWVZLWKRXW VXFKD VKRFN VXFKDV WKH0DVRQ&RXUW¶VFKDOOHQJH WR
legalism in Australia in the 1990s, will likely fail or be absorbed by the dominant legal 
culture.12 Roux also finds that some kinds of regimes appear to be rare. For example, he 
finds few examples of democratic legalism outside of India and the United States, he 
DUJXHV EHFDXVH ³>V@LWXDWLRQV LQZKLFK MXGLFLDO GHFLVLRQ-making in a democracy is both 
clearly ideologically motivated and politically tolerated depend on an unusual combination 
RIIDFWRUV´13
Roux also draws out some of the normative implications of his theory, suggesting 
that different regimes of judicial review raise different questions and have different 
weaknesses. Democratic legalism, for example, depends on the suspension of disbelief on 
the point that law can be separated from politics and may make a constitutional regime 
more rigid.14 Instrumentalism, however, may make the courts and constitution a partisan 
battleground (as Roux argues happened in the US) or a locus of complaints about 
democratic dysfunction (as he argued happened in India).15
Both books push beyond existing work in interesting ways. Brinks and Blass, for 
example, problematize the foundational concept of judicial independence. As they note, 
all courts are dependent in some sense on the support of certain groups.16 What really 
                                                          
 10. See David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy, 53 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1313 (2020). 
 11. See ROUX, supra note 4, at 51. 
 12. See id. at 144±45. 
 13. Id. at 257. 
 14. See id. at 312. 
 15. See id. at 312±13. 
 16. See BRINKS & BLASS, supra note 3, at 20±21 (noting that existing theories of judicial independence ³deny 
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varies, then, are the identities of the actors in this group, and tracking these differences can 
tell us a lot about how a court is likely to behave. ,Q³UHJLPHDOO\´FRXUWVWKRVHRQWKH
court will usually be dependent on the regime itself; in other kinds of courts, the political 
coalitions to which courts are accountable may be more complex or even include other 
actors such as judges, but there are still mechanisms of accountability. Often, then, asking 
how independent a court is will be less useful than asking to which actors its judges tend 
to be accountable. 5RX[¶VZRUNLQWXUQLVDYDOLDQWDWWHPSWWREULQJLGHDWLRQDOFRQFHSWV
about law into judicial politics. Without question, as he argues, these conceptions matter 
greatly in the way judges, political elites, and citizens look at and use law, and they have 
very rarely been integrated into political theories of judicial review.17
While the broad typologies developed by both books are useful, both also suggest 
new questions and invitations to further²and perhaps even finer-grained²work. Roux 
may be right that broad shifts between legalism and instrumentalism are rare, but his own 
book points out many examples of shifts between subtypes of legalism and 
instrumentalism that are quite rich. Take Germany as an example. The dominant modern 
constitutional culture has retained an emphasis on formalism from its historical roots, in 
0LFKDHOD+DLOEURQQHU¶VWHOOLQJEXWKDVVKLIWHGWRZDUGVZKDWVKHFDOOV³YDOXHIRUPDOLVP´
a more substantive conception of formalism emphasizing the weighing of constitutional 
values.18 Something similar happened in Colombia when the new constitution and 
Constitutional Court were created in 1991: an older constitutional culture with a procedural 
YDULDQWRIIRUPDOLVPJDYHZD\WRVXEVWDQWLYH³YDOXHIRUPDOLVP´WKDWKDVDOORZHGIRUWKH
emergence of one of the strongest and most creative high courts in the world.19 Roux is 
right to point to an element of continuity between these shifts, but they are nonetheless 
consequential. 
A related point is that countries often have internal heterogeneity in their regimes of 
judicial review. Different judges, or legal elites, may have very different conceptions of 
what judicial review means. Take Colombia again as an example. The dominant legal 
FXOWXUH KDV EHHQ ³YDOXH IRUPDOLVW´ %XW VRPH RI WKH PRVW LQIOXHQWLDO MXGJHV RQ WKH
Colombian Constitutional Court have carried a more instrumental vision of law. Justice 
Manuel Jose Cepeda Espinosa, for example, who was educated in the United States, helped 
design the Constitutional Court as a young legal adviser, and later served as one of its most 
LQIOXHQWLDOMXGJHVLVDGHYRWHHRI1RQHWDQG6HO]QLFN¶VFRQFHSWLRQof responsive law. I 
have argued that he was influential in part because he was D³MXULVSUXGHQWLDORXWVLGHU´²a
savvy instrumentalist in a formalist world. 20
Similarly, there may be heterogeneity between elite and popular conceptions of 
constitutional law. Roux categorizes the United States as a paradigmatic case of legal 
                                                          
th[e] essential fact´ that courts are ³political institutions´). 
 17. See ROUX, supra note 4, at 85±89. 
 18. See MICHAELA HAILBRONNER, TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RISE OF GERMAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 97 (2015). 
 19. See David Landau, The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New Approach to 
Modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America, 37 GEO. WASH. INT¶L L. REV. 687 (2005). 
 20. See DAVID LANDAU, A FUSION OF THE POLITICAL AND THE LEGAL: JUSTICE CEPEDA¶S INSTITUTION 
BUILDING OF THE COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, IN TOWERING JUSTICES (Iddo Porat & Rehan 
Abeyratne eds., forthcoming 2020). 
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instrumentalism. I am more skeptical. There are certainly significant elements of 
instrumentalism among US lawyers. But these views are by no means uncontested and 
seemingly formalist methods of constitutional interpretation like originalism in fact are 
increasingly strong. Regardless of views at the elite level, at any rate, popular views of 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOODZLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDUHSUREDEO\EHVWHQFDSVXODWHGE\-XVWLFH5REHUW¶V
analogy at his confirmation hearings that judges are mere umpires who do not get to make 
the rules.21
The typology between four types of courts constructed by Brinks and Blass seems 
to explain a good chunk of the logic of the design of high courts in Latin America. The 
obvious extension of the project is into questions that show the ways in which 
constitutional design interacts with the performance of the court over time, and the ways 
in which models can change. For the most part the authors²quite sensibly²leave these 
questions aside in their own project. 
One way judicial design can change over time is through formal amendment. Take 
Mexico, where the Supreme Court was either a sidelined court or weak regime ally until 
1994, when it was transformed into a procedural arbiter mainly tasked with adjudicating 
political disputes in the new multiparty political system.22 The rules were changed again 
in 2011, when the individual complaint or amparo was strengthened and an incorporation 
clause was added requiring construction of constitutional rights in light of human rights 
treaties.23 This has likely made the Mexican Court into a major policy player, as shown 
by recent rulings on a range of topics including same-sex marriage and decriminalizing 
drug possession. 
Courts themselves, once created, may also become participants in judicial design. 
The individual complaint mechanisms found in Latin America offer a good example. 
Constitutional and statutory texts on these mechanisms themselves vary widely within 
Latin America.24 But judicial construction is also important in many countries. The 
Colombian tutela is a striking example. The text itself designs a powerful and simple 
instrument²decisions must be made within ten days at each level, and expressly do not 
need the assistance of a lawyer.25 But the Court itself has settled textual ambiguities and 
created doctrine in ways that have massively increased its power. For example, the Court 
held that the tutela could be used to enforce socioeconomic rights as well as civil and 
political rights, review ordinary judicial decisions, and issue structural, as opposed to 
merely individual, remedies.26 None of these points was clear in the text. One way of 
looking at what the Court did is that it was fleshing out the spirit of the constitutional 
                                                          
 21. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States, 
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court) (³Judges are like umpires. Umpires 
don¶t make the rules, they apply them.´). 
 22. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS 128 (2008). 
 23. See BRINKS & BLASS, supra note 3, at 42. 
 24. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 22, at 87±91. 
 25. David E. Landau, Beyond Judicial Independence: The Construction of Judicial Power in Colombia 88 
(Oct. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (available at 
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/14226088). 
 26. See id. at 87±88. 
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project; a more radical take is that it seized the ability to create its own power. 
In short, the books by Roux and Brinks and Blass do a great service to the field²
WKH\ EXLOG RII RI EXW PRYH EH\RQG WKH WUDGLWLRQDO OLWHUDWXUH¶V IRFXV %RWK DOVR SRLQW
towards further questions, and complexities, that should preoccupy further work in the 
field, at the intersection of law and legal culture, as well as that between design, 
constitutional change, and judicial behavior. 
